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of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other
hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable
for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.
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1 Introduction
Ever since their publication, the two most important results of social choice theory,
the impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite, have led to a steady
search for possibility results on restricted domains (see Gaertner (2002) for a recent
overview). The usual approach is to fix an appropriate set of admissible preferences,
and to investigate which social welfare functions satisfy Arrow’s conditions, respectively
which social choice functions are non-manipulable, on that preference domain. Classic
examples of this approach are Black (1958) and Moulin (1980) who consider the domain
of single-peaked preferences.1
A somewhat different view on the question has been developed by Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) based on Maskin (1995). These authors consider specific preference
aggregation rules such as majority rule, plurality rule or the Borda count, and ask on
what domains these rules satisfy desirable conditions in the spirit of Arrow’s condi-
tions. The present paper follows this approach. Specifically, we restrict our attention
here to the Borda count and, slightly more generally, to scoring methods (cf. Moulin
(1988)). We characterize the preference domains on which scoring methods satisfy Ar-
row’s conditions (“Arrovian domains”). In contrast to Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), we
impose the original independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, not their stronger
neutrality condition. By consequence, the Arrovian domains for the Borda count deter-
mined here encompass the domains that satisfy Dasgupta and Maskin’s characterizing
condition of “quasi-agreement.” Our analysis also shows that all Arrovian domains for
the Borda count that are minimally “rich” in the sense that any social alternative is on
top of at least one preference ordering, are obtained by fixing one preference ordering
over the alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. Remarkably, these are
precisely the configurations of preferences that give rise to the Condorcet paradox. The
rich domains on which the Borda count “works well” thus turn out to be exactly the
problematic domains for majority voting.2
We then consider the question on which domains the Borda count is strategy-proof.
Since the Borda count does in general not select one single social alternative, we have to
consider tie-breaking rules here. It turns out that the Borda count is strategy-proof with
any given tie-breaking rule on all Arrovian domains. The converse is not true, however.
We show by example that there exist rich domains on which the Borda count violates
the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition but is nevertheless strategy-proof
when combined with some suitable tie-breaking rule. On the other hand, under the
richness condition, strategy-proofness of the Borda count with all tie-breaking rules
yields again exactly the Arrovian domains (one fixed preference ordering together with
all its cyclic permutations).
Our analysis confirms the general view of the literature that the Borda count is
highly vulnerable to strategic manipulation.3 This intuition is made precise here in
1See also Barbera´, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) and Barbera´, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) for multi-
dimensional extensions, and Nehring and Puppe (2003a,b) for a unifying approach to impossibility
and possibility results based on “generalized single-peaked preferences” in the context of strategy-
proofness.
2The apparent conflict of this conclusion with Dasgupta and Maskin’s (2000) robustness result for
majority voting is due to the fact that we do not impose neutrality here.
3Recently, there have been different approaches to measuring the degree of “vulnerability” of voting
procedures to strategic manipulation, see Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) and Smith (1999), among
others. The most relevant study in our context is Favardin, Leppelley and Serais (2002) who character-
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two ways. First, for any preference ordering, there is only one rich domain that con-
tains the given preference ordering and that renders the Borda count non-manipulable.
By contrast, for other choice rules there are frequently many different rich and non-
manipulable domains that contain a given preference ordering; for instance, there are
many rich single-peaked domains that contain a given single-peaked preference order-
ing. Secondly, any fixed rich domain on which the Borda count is non-manipulable is
as small as it could possibly be, since it contains just as many orderings as there are
social states. Again, this strong restriction does not apply to single-peaked domains,
for instance. Thus, the overall conclusion from our analysis is that the Borda count
fares poorly in terms of strategic manipulation, in the sense that there are very few
non-manipulable domains all of which are, moreover, very small.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our basic notation
and definitions. Section 3 provides the characterization of the Arrovian domains for
general scoring methods. In Section 4, we consider the most interesting special case
of the Borda count. For this case, we provide an alternative global characterization
which in particular yields the cyclic permutation structure of all rich Arrovian domains.
In Section 5, we then investigate the structure of non-manipulable domains. While
some proofs are included in the main text, the more technical ones are collected in an
appendix.
2 Basic Notation and Definitions
2.1 Social Welfare Functionals and the Arrow Conditions
Let X be a finite universe of social states or social alternatives. By PX , we denote the
set of all linear orderings (irreflexive, transitive and total binary relations) on X, and
by P ⊆ PX a generic subdomain of the unrestricted domain PX . Moreover, denote by
R the set of all weak orderings (reflexive, transitive and complete binary relations).
Definition (Social welfare functional) A mapping F :
⋃∞
n=1 Pn → R that assigns
a social preference ordering F (1, ...,n) ∈ R to each n-tuple of linear orderings and
all n is called a social welfare functional (SWF).
Thus, we do allow for non-trivial indifferences on the social level but not on the in-
dividual level. Note also that we require a SWF to be defined for societies with any
finite number of agents. For some of our results this will be important. Alternatively,
we could have assumed a continuum of agents as e.g. in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000).
A SWF F satisfies the Pareto rule on P if, for all x, y ∈ X, all i∈ P and all n,
[x i y for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ x  y,
where  is the strict part of the social preference relation  = F (1, ...,n).
A SWF F is called non-dictatorial on P if, either #P = 1 or, for all n ≥ 2 and
all i = 1, ..., n, there exist x, y ∈ X and i∈ P such that x i y and y  x, where
 = F (1, ...,n).
ize (for the case of three alternatives) the preference profiles at which the Borda count is manipulable.
Their conclusion is that the Borda count is significantly more vulnerable than, say, the Copeland
method. Note that, in contrast to this literature, our aim is not to determine the relative frequency of
possible manipulation on an unrestricted domain, but to characterize the restricted domains on which
manipulation can never occur.
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A SWF F satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) on P if, for all
x, y ∈ X, all n and all i,′i∈ P,
[i |{x,y} =′i |{x,y} for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ |{x,y} =′ |{x,y},
where  = F (1, ...,n), ′ = F (′1, ...,′n), and  |{x,y} denotes the restriction of
the binary relation  to the pair {x, y}.
Definition (Scoring method) Let q be the cardinality of X, and let s : {1, ..., q} → R
satisfy s(1) ≥ s(2) ≥ ... ≥ s(q) and s(1) > s(q). Moreover, let rk[x,] denote the rank
of alternative x in the ordering  (i.e. rk[x,] = 1 if x is the top alternative in the
ranking , rk[x,] = 2 if x is second-best, and so on). A SWF is a scoring method if
for some function s, all x, y ∈ X, all n and all i, i = 1, ..., n,
x  y ⇔
n∑
i=1
s(rk[x,i]) ≥
n∑
i=1
s(rk[y,i]),
where  is the social preference corresponding to (1, ...,n). The scoring method
corresponding to the function s : {1, ..., q} → R will be denoted by F s. A scoring
method is called proper if s is strictly decreasing.
Definition (Borda count) The Borda count (or “rank-order voting rule”), denoted
by FB , is the proper scoring method corresponding to the function s(k) = q + 1 − k
for k = 1, ..., q.
Clearly, all scoring methods are non-dictatorial; moreover, any proper scoring method
satisfies the Pareto rule. On the other hand, scoring methods do not generally satisfy
the IIA condition. A characterization of the domains on which scoring methods satisfy
this condition will be provided in Section 3 below.
2.2 Social Choice Functions and Non-Manipulability
Definition (Social choice function) A mapping f :
⋃∞
n=1 Pn → X that assigns a
social alternative to each n-tuple of linear orderings and all n is called a social choice
function (SCF).
A SCF f satisfies unanimity on P if, for all x ∈ X, all i∈ P and all n,
[rk[x,i] = 1 for all i = 1, ..., n] ⇒ x = f(1, ...,n).
A SCF f is called non-manipulable, or strategy-proof on P if for all n, all i,′i∈ P
and all −i∈ Pn−1,
f(i,−i) i f(′i,−i).
Example (Borda count with tie-breaking rule) For our purposes, a tie-breaking
rule is simply a linear ordering τ on X. Given a tie-breaking rule τ , any SWF F
uniquely defines a SCF f by associating to each preference profile (1, ...,n) the τ -
best element of F (1, ...,n) ⊆ X. Below we will specifically consider the Borda count
FB together with a tie-breaking rule τ ; the resulting SCF will be denoted by fBτ . Note
that fBτ satisfies unanimity.
Obviously, sufficiently “small” domains can give rise to strategy-proofness in a trivial
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way. For instance, any SCF is vacuously strategy-proof on any domain consisting of
one single preference ordering. We will therefore be often interested in domains that
are “rich” in the sense that any alternative is on top of some preference ordering.4
Definition (Rich domain) A domain P is called rich if for any x ∈ X there exists
∈ P such that rk[x,] = 1.
3 Arrovian Domains for Scoring Methods
It is well-known that scoring methods violate the IIA condition on the unrestricted
domain PX . However, scoring methods may well satisfy this condition on restricted
domains. We will say that P is an Arrovian domain for the SCW F if F is non-
dictatorial and satisfies the Pareto rule as well as IIA on P.
Definition (Equal score difference) A domain P satisfies the equal score difference
condition with respect to s if, for all x, y ∈ X, either all orderings in P agree on {x, y},
or if not, then
s(rk[x,])− s(rk[y,]) = s(rk[x,′])− s(rk[y,′])
for all ,′∈ P such that |{x,y} =′ |{x,y}.
Note that for the Borda count the latter condition reduces to
rk[x,]− rk[y,] = rk[x,′]− rk[y,′]
for all ,′∈ P such that  |{x,y} =′ |{x,y}, which we will also refer to as the equal
rank difference condition.
Theorem 1 A domain is Arrovian for the proper scoring method F s if and only if it
satisfies the equal score difference condition with respect to s.
Proof Clearly, any scoring method is non-dictatorial and satisfies the Pareto rule on
any domain. Let P satisfy the equal score difference condition. In order to verify
IIA consider any x, y ∈ X and i∈ P for i = 1, ..., n. Suppose that x  y, where
= F s(1, ...,n), i.e. suppose that
n∑
i=1
[s(rk[x,i])− s(rk[y,i])] ≥ 0. (3.1)
If all orderings in P agree on {x, y}, we must in fact have x  y, and this relative
ranking of x and y holds for the social preference corresponding to any profile. Thus,
assume that not all orderings in P agree on the pair {x, y}. Then, by the equal score
difference condition, the inequality (3.1) is preserved when any voter i’s ordering i∈ P
is replaced by an ordering ′i∈ P that agrees with i on {x, y}. This shows that F s
satisfies IIA on P.
Conversely, suppose that the domain P does not satisfy the equal score difference
condition. Then, there exist x, y ∈ X and three orderings ,′,′′∈ P such that
l := s(rk[y,′′])− s(rk[x,′′]) > 0
4This condition is often imposed in the literature. It is much weaker than the richness condition
used in Nehring and Puppe (2003a).
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and
s(rk[x,])− s(rk[y,]) =: m > m′ := s(rk[x,′])− s(rk[y,′]) > 0.
Choose n1 and n2 such that
l
m′
>
n1
n2
>
l
m
,
and consider the following two profiles of n1 + n2 individual preferences. In the first
profile, denoted by Π = (, ...,,′′, ... ′′), the first n1 voters have the preference
 and the remaining n2 voters have the preference ′′; in the second profile, denoted
by Π′ = (′, ...,′,′′, ...,′′), the first n1 voters have the preference ′, and the
remaining n2 voters have the preference ′′. By construction, x is ranked strictly
above y in the social ranking F s(Π) corresponding to the first profile, while y is strictly
above x in the social ranking F s(Π′) corresponding to the second profile. This yields
the desired violation of IIA and completes the proof.
4 A Special Case: The Borda Count
The restrictiveness of the equal score difference condition depends on the scoring rule.
For instance, suppose that X = {x, y, z} and consider any scoring method s that does
not coincide with the Borda count, i.e. s(2)− s(1) 6= s(3)− s(2). It is easily seen that
any domain that satisfies the equal score difference condition with respect to such s can
consist of at most two preference orderings on X. More generally, one can show that,
for arbitrary X, no scoring method different from the Borda count can satisfy the equal
score difference condition on any rich domain. On the other hand, for the Borda count
there are rich domains satisfying the corresponding (equal rank difference) condition.
In the following, we will provide a “global” characterization of all such domains. Before
we do so, we briefly want to compare our equal rank difference condition to Dasgupta
and Maskin’s (2000) condition of “quasi-agreement.” That condition requires that any
triple {x, y, z} admit one member, say x, such that all orderings in the domain agree on
either (i) x being the best element among the three, or (ii) x being the middle element,
or (iii) x being the worst element among the triple. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) show
that the property of quasi-agreement characterizes the domains on which the Borda
count satisfies an appropriate neutrality condition stronger than Arrow’s independence
of irrelevant alternatives considered here. By consequence, quasi-agreement is more
restrictive than the equal rank difference condition. This can be directly verified by
contraposition, as follows. Suppose that a domain violates the equal rank difference
condition, i.e. there exist three orderings 1, 2 and 3 such that
rk[y,1]− rk[x,1] > rk[y,2]− rk[x,2] > 0 (4.1)
and rk[y,3] − rk[x,3] < 0. By (4.1), there exists a third alternative z such that
x 1 z 1 y but not (x 2 z 2 y), in which case the three orderings violate quasi-
agreement on the triple {x, y, z}.
Equal rank difference as well as quasi-agreement are “local” conditions; the former
imposes restrictions on any pair, the latter on any triple. It is therefore not evident how
these conditions are reflected in the “global” structure of the corresponding domains.
We now provide an alternative characterization of equal rank difference domains that
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makes this global structure explicit. An ordering ′ is called a cyclic permutation of
 if ′ can be obtained from  by sequentially shifting the bottom element to the top
while leaving the order between all other alternatives unchanged. Thus, for instance,
the cyclic permutations of the ordering abcd are dabc, cdab and bcda. The set of all
cyclic permutations of a fixed ordering  is denoted by Z(). Say that a domain P is
hierarchically cyclic if there exists a partition {X1, ..., Xr} of X such that for all ∈ P
and all i ∈ {1, ..., r},
(i) x  y whenever x ∈ Xi, y ∈ Xj and j > i, and
(ii) {′ |Xi : ′∈ P} ⊆ Z( |Xi) or #{′ |Xi : ′∈ P} ≤ 2
Thus, a domain is hierarchically cyclic if the universe of alternatives can be partioned
in such a way that (i) the partition elements themselves are ordered unambiguously and
identically by all orderings, and (ii) within each partition element Xi, the restrictions
to Xi give rise to at most two different orderings on Xi, or they are cyclic permutations
of each other. The following table shows a typical domain satisfying this condition.
Table 1: A hierarchically cyclic domain
1 2 3 4 5
x1 x2 x4 x2 x4
x2 x3 x1 x3 x1
x3 x4 x2 x4 x2
x4 x1 x3 x1 x3
y1 y1 y3 y3 y1
y2 y2 y2 y2 y2
y3 y3 y1 y1 y3
u u u u u
z1 z2 z3 z1 z2
z2 z3 z1 z2 z3
z3 z1 z2 z3 z1
In the example shown in Table 1, the partition from the definition of a hierarchically
cyclic domain is given by X1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, X2 = {y1, y2, y3}, X3 = {u} and X4 =
{z1, z2, z3}. Note that the preferences are cyclic permutations of one fixed ordering on
X1 and X4. The two different restrictions on X2 are not cyclic permutations of each
other; nevertheless, the domain satisfies the defining condition since #X2 ≤ 2.
Proposition 1 A domain P satisfies the equal rank difference condition if and only if
it is hierarchically cyclic.
It is easily verified that any hierarchically cyclic domain satisfies the equal rank differ-
ence condition. The more difficult proof of the converse statement is deferred to the
appendix. As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, we obtain the
following result showing that all rich Arrovian domains for the Borda count are ob-
tained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations; such
domains will henceforth be referred to as cyclic permutation domains. Note that the
cyclic permutation domains on three alternatives are precisely the “Condorcet cycles.”
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Theorem 2 For any linear ordering , there is exactly one rich Arrovian domain for
the Borda count that contains , namely the cyclic permutation domain Z().
5 Non-Manipulable Domains
We now want to ask on what domains the Borda count with tie-breaking rule is non-
manipulable. The following result shows that the equal score/rank difference condition
is sufficient for non-manipulability.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the domain P satisfies the equal score difference condi-
tion. Then, any scoring method with any tie-breaking rule is strategy-proof on P.
Proof Take any preference profile (1, ...,n), and suppose that x is the chosen alter-
native. Consider any alternative y that voter i prefers to x. Since y was not chosen
there must exist another voter j such that x j y. By the equal score difference con-
dition, any preference that favours y over x must display the same score difference
between these alternatives as i. In particular, voter i cannot change the difference in
total scores of y relative to x by reporting a preference that favours y over x. Since y
is arbitrary this shows that voter i cannot successfully manipulate.
We now turn to the question of the necessary conditions for non-manipulability. This
is a more difficult problem, and we will concentrate on the most interesting case of the
Borda count. As already noted, if many conceivable preference orderings are excluded,
strategy-proofness can result simply from the lack of misrepresentation possibilities.
We will thus focus in the following on rich domains. Recall that the rich domains sat-
isfying the equal rank difference condition are the cyclic permutation domains. First,
we show by example that the Borda count may be non-manipulable also on domains
that do not have the form of cyclic permutation domains, provided the tie-breaking
rule is appropriately chosen.
Example (Non-manipulability without equal rank difference) Consider on the
universe X = {a, b, c, d} the domain {I ,II ,III ,IV }, where a I b I c I d,
b II a II d II c, c III d III a III b and d IV c IV b IV a. Clearly, this
domain is rich and not a cyclic permutation domain. Observe that the equal rank dif-
ference condition is only violated by the two pairs (a, d) and (b, c). Hence, manipulation
is only possible between alternatives a and d, or b and c, respectively. In particular,
one can easily check that a voter of type I, II, III or IV can potentially benefit only
by reporting type II, I, IV or III, respectively. Note that for any manipulation of
this kind, a voter can increase the total score difference only of two alternatives si-
multaneously over the other two alternatives; moreover, any such change in the score
difference is by exactly two units. This property makes the domain rather special.
We will now show that the Borda count is non-manipulable when combined with
the tie-breaking rule aτbτcτd. Suppose that a profile with n voters consists of k, l, m
and p preferences of types I , II , III and IV , respectively. Then, we have
n∑
i=1
rk [a,i] + rk [d,i] =
n∑
i=1
rk [b,i] + rk [c,i] = 5 (k + l +m+ p) . (5.1)
It follows from (5.1) that, if there is to be room for manipulation at all, the total scores
of all four alternatives have to be close to each other. Consider the case in which a was
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chosen by fBτ ; the other cases can be treated analogously. If a was chosen, then only
a voter of type III might potentially benefit from manipulating (by misreporting to
be of type IV ). By the above observations and by the form of the tie-breaking rule,
alternative d could “overtake” a only if before both received the same total score, or
if a led only by one unit. In the first case, all four alternatives received the same total
score by (5.1), while in the latter case b’s total score was greater or equal to the total
score of d, again by (5.1). Hence, misreporting type IV either does not change the
outcome, or makes b the winner, which is not beneficial to a type III voter.
The example shows that on rich domains the equal rank difference condition is not
necessary for non-manipulability of the Borda count together with a fixed tie-breaking
rule. However, if we require non-manipulability of the Borda count when combined
with any tie-breaking rule, the equal rank difference condition re-emerges, as shown by
the following result.
Theorem 3 Suppose that the Borda count is non-manipulable on the rich domain P
for all tie-breaking rules τ . Then, P satisfies the equal rank difference condition, i.e. P
is a cyclic permutation domain.
The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in the appendix. The following example shows
that the richness assumption in Theorem 3 is needed. Consider on X = {a, b, c, d} the
domain consisting of the three preference orderings abcd, dabc and dacb. This domain
violates the equal rank difference condition (in fact even any equal score difference
condition). But the Borda count is non-manipulable with any tie-breaking rule. In-
deed, alternatives b and c can never win, while there are obviously no manipulation
possibilities between alternatives a and d.
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Appendix: Remaining proofs
For the proof of Proposition 1, we need the following notation. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤
q = #X let |[i,j] be the restriction of  ranging from the ith position to the jth
position of , i.e., |[i,j]=|{xi,xi+1,...,xj} where x1  . . .  xi  . . .  xj  . . .  xq.
In addition, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ q, we define P[i,j] :=
{|[i,j] : ∈ P}. Furthermore,
for any linear ordering  on X ′ ⊆ X we shall denote by Ti() the set of the top i
alternatives of , i.e., Ti() = {x ∈ X ′ : rk [x,] ≤ i}.
Proof of Proposition 1 It is straightforward to check that a hierarchically cyclic
domain satifies ERD. Hence, we have to prove the converse statement.
Step 1: We construct recursively a partition of X. Let i0 := 0. To obtain the first
partition element X1, we determine the smallest integer i ∈ {i0 + 1, . . . , q} satisfying
∀x ∈ X,∀ ,′∈ P : i0 < rk [x,] ≤ i⇔ i0 < rk [x,′] ≤ i. (A.1)
Clearly, at least q satisfies (A.1) and therefore there exists a smallest i, denoted by i1,
satisfying (A.1). Set X1 := {x ∈ X : i0 < rk [x,] ≤ i1} for some  ∈ P. If X1 = X,
then we are finished and the partition consists only of the single set X1. If X1 6= X,
then we proceed inductively to obtain i2 and X2 from (A.1). Repeating this procedure,
we get the desired partition X1, . . . , Xr.
In the following, we only have to consider those sets Xj for which
#P[ij−1+1,ij ] = #
{′|Xj : ′∈ P} > 2. (A.2)
Pick an arbitrary set Xj satisfying (A.2), and set Pj := P[ij−1+1,ij ] =
{1, . . . ,nj}
and qj := ij − ij−1. Clearly, qj ≥ 3 because of (A.2).
Step 2: First, we establish that Pj contains three preference relations with different
top alternatives. Obviously, not all preferences can have the same top alternative, since
this would be in contradiction with the construction of Xj . Thus, suppose that the
preferences in Pj have two different top alternatives. Without loss of generality we
can assume that the first p ∈ {2, . . . , nj − 1} preferences have a ∈ Xj as their top
alternative, while the remaining preferences have another alternative b ∈ Xj \ {a} as
their top alternative. Define
Y := {x ∈ Xj : ∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . , p} , rk [x,k] = rk [x,l]} . (A.3)
Clearly, a ∈ Y . Moreover, we must also have rk [b,k] = rk [b,l] for all k, l ∈
{1, . . . , p} by ERD, hence b ∈ Y . Let
J := {k ∈ {1, . . . , qj} : ∃y ∈ Y, k = rk [y,1]} and
i∗ := max {k ∈ {1, . . . , qj} : {1, . . . , k} ⊆ J} .
Observe that i∗ is well defined, since {1} ⊆ J .
Clearly, if i∗ = qj , then we have 1= . . . =p, which cannot be the case, since
the preferences 1, . . . ,p are distinct. Hence, we may assume that i∗ < qj . ERD
implies that any alternative z ∈ Xj \Y must be ranked below the i∗th position by any
preference relation having b on top, since z changes its rank difference to all alternatives
in Ti∗(1) = . . . = Ti∗(p). Formally,
∀z ∈ Xj \ Y, ∀l ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , nj} : rk [z,l] > i∗. (A.4)
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Suppose now that none of the alternatives in Y are ranked lower than i∗ (i.e. suppose
that {1, . . . , i∗} = J). Then, we obtain Ti∗ (1) = . . . = Ti∗
(nj) by (A.4), which
contradicts the construction of Xj .
Thus, there exists an alternative y ∈ Y with rk [y,1] > i∗+1 (i.e. {1, . . . , i∗} 6= J).
In this case, we will show that
∀y ∈ Y, ∀l ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , nj} : rk [y,1] > i∗ + 1⇒ rk [y,l] > i∗.5 (A.5)
Indeed, suppose that this is not the case, i.e. suppose that y ∈ Y is such that rk [y,1] >
i∗ + 1 and rk [y,l] ≤ i∗ for some l ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , nj}. Now pick two alternatives
u, v ∈ Xj \ Y and a preference relation k, k ∈ {2, . . . , p}, such that rk [u,1] =
rk [v,k] = i∗ + 1. If u k y or v 1 y, then the pair {u, y} or the pair {v, y},
respectively, violates ERD, since y l u and y l v by (A.4). Similarly, it can be
verified that if v k y k u and u 1 y 1 v, then at least one of the pairs {u, v},
{v, y} or {u, y} violate ERD by (A.4). We have thus derived a contradiction, hence
(A.5) holds. Together with (A.4), this implies that all alternatives ranked below the
i∗th position in the first p orderings must also be ranked below the i∗th position
in all remaining orderings. But this means again that Ti∗ (1) = . . . = Ti∗
(nj),
contradicting the definition of Xj . Thus, we must have at least three different top
alternatives in Pj .
Step 3: We now show that any three top alternatives in Pj produce a Condorcet
cycle. Pick preferences k,m,l∈ Pj having the three different alternatives a, b, c ∈
Xj , respectively, on top. Without loss of generality we may assume that a k b k c.
Now it can easily be verified that from the four possibilites
[a k b k c, b m a m c, c l a l b] ,
[a k b k c, b m c m a, c l a l b] ,
[a k b k c, b m a m c, c l b l a] , and
[a k b k c, b m c m a, c l b l a]
only the Condorcet cycle satisfies ERD.
Step 4: We claim that for any three different top alternatives a, c and b, where
rk [a,k] = rk [c,l] = rk [b,m] = 1, there exists tk,l,m ∈ {1, . . . , qj} such that
{l|[1,tk,l,m],m|[1,tk,l,m]} ⊆ Z
(k|[1,tk,l,m]). By Step 3 we can assume that the top
elements are ordered in the following way a k b k c, c l a l b, b m c m a. Take
an alternative x such that c l x l a. Suppose that a m x; this implies c k x by
ERD. But then ERD must be violated, since x cannot maintain its rank difference to
both a and b in k as well as in m. Hence, we have x m a, and by ERD, the rank
difference between x and a has to be the same in l as in m. In a similar way one
can establish that rk [b,k]− rk [z,k] = rk [b,l]− rk [z,l] for any a k z k b and
that rk [c,m]− rk [y,m] = rk [c,k]− rk [y,k] for any b m y m c.
Next we pick an alternative z satisfying a l z l b. Then z must be ranked below
a in m, since by the above argument, {w : c l w l a} = {w : c m w m a},
{w : b m w m c} = {w : b k w k c}, and {w : a k w k b} = {w : a l
w l b}. Hence, by ERD, rk [c,l] − rk [z,l] = rk [c,m] − rk [z,m]. Similarly,
rk [a,k] − rk [y,k] = rk [a,l] − rk [y,l] for any b k y k c, and rk [b,m] −
rk [x,m] = rk [b,k]− rk [x,k] for any c m x m a. Finally, observe that we can
choose tk,l,m = rk [b,k]− rk [a,k] + rk [a,l]− rk [c,l] + rk [c,m]− rk [b,m].
5Observe that this implies rk [b,1] ≤ i∗, since b ∈ Y and rk [b,p+1] = 1.
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Step 5: Now we can complete the proof. Assume that a, b, c, d4, . . . dnj are the top
alternatives of 1, . . . ,nj , respectively, where a, b and c are pairwise distinct. Apply
Step 4 to preferences 1, 2 and 3, and pick another preference relation m∈ Pj
arbitrarily.
First, if one of the three first top alternatives, say c, is also the top alternative
of m, then Step 3 and ERD imply rk [a,3] − rk [c,3] = rk [a,m] − rk [c,m]
and rk [b,3] − rk [c,3] = rk [b,m] − rk [c,m]. Hence, by Step 4 we must have
3|[1,t1,2,3]=m|[1,t1,2,3]∈ Z
(1|[1,t1,2,3]).
Second, suppose that dm ∈ Xj is distinct from a, b and c. Then it can be eas-
ily verified that 2|[1,t1,2,3]∈ Z
(1|[1,t1,2,3]) and 2|[1,t1,2,m]∈ Z (1|[1,t1,2,m]) implies
t1,2,3 = t1,2,m.
Thus, in both cases we obtain Tt1,2,3 (1) = . . . = Tt1,2,3
(nj). Therefore, we must
have t1,2,m = qj for all m ∈ {3, . . . , nj} by the construction of Xj . This completes the
proof of Proposition 1.
For the proof of Theorem 3, we need the following series of lemmas. Given a profile
of preferences (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn, we say that alternatives A ⊆ X are indifferent on
the top if
n∑
i=1
rk [a,i] =
n∑
i=1
rk [b,i] <
n∑
i=1
rk [c,i] (A.6)
for all a, b ∈ A and all c ∈ X \A.
Lemma A.1 If there exists a preference profile (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn with alternatives
{x, y} ⊆ X being indifferent on the top and violating ERD, then there exists a tie-
breaking rule such that Borda count is manipulable on P.
Proof of Lemma A.1 Suppose that profile Π := (1, . . . ,n) ∈ Pn has alternatives
x and y violating ERD indifferent on the top. If according to Π we have
n∑
i=1
rk [x,i] =
n∑
i=1
rk [y,i] ≥
n∑
i=1
rk [c,i]− 2 (#X − 1)
for some c ∈ X \ {x, y}, then we can take a ‘multiple’ of profile Π consisting of l
preferences of type i for each i such that
l
n∑
i=1
rk [x,i] = l
n∑
i=1
rk [y,i] < l
n∑
i=1
rk [c,i]− 2 (#X − 1) (A.7)
for all c ∈ X \ {x, y} and l sufficiently large by (A.6). This ensures that if only one
voter reveals another preference relation, then either x or y will still be the Borda
winning alternative. For notational convenience we will assume in what follows that
Π = (1, . . . ,n) already satisfies (A.7).
Since x and y are indifferent on the top, profile Π must have voters with preferences
i and j such that x i y and y j x. Suppose that there exists another preference
′∈ P such that x ′ y and rk [y,′] − rk [x,′] 6= rk [y,i] − rk [x,i]. Now if
rk [y,′]− rk [x,′] > rk [y,i]− rk [x,i], then, taking a tie-breaking rule selecting
y as the winner in case of ties between x and y, a voter having preference i could
manipulate by revealing preference ′. Otherwise, if rk [y,′]−rk [x,′] < rk [y,i]−
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rk [x,i], then we take the tie-breaking rule, which selects x as the winner in case of
ties between x and y. Consider profile (1, . . . ,i−1,′,i+1, . . . ,n), which has y as
the Borda winner. Clearly, voter i can achieve a tie between x and y by revealing i
instead of ′ and therefore, enforce that x will be chosen, which he prefers to y.
Finally, if there does not exist a preference ′∈ P such that x ′ y and rk [y,′]−
rk [x,′] 6= rk [y,i]−rk [x,i], then there exists a preference ′∈ P such that y ′ x
and rk [x,′]− rk [y,′] 6= rk [x,i]− rk [y,i], since x and y violate ERD. Hence, to
complete the proof we just have to exchange the roles of x and y while repeating the
arguments of the previous paragraph.
The next lemma is a simple corollary to Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.2 If in a rich domain P there exists a preference  with its top two alter-
natives violating ERD, then there exists a tie-breaking rule such that Borda count is
manipulable on P.
Proof of Lemma A.2 Let rk [x,] = 1 and rk [y,] = 2. Since P is a rich domain,
we can find a preference ′∈ P, which has y as the top alternative. We define d :=
rk [x,′] − rk [y,′]. Now taking one voter with ′ and d voters with  we obtain
a profile that has {x, y} indifferent on the top, since y dominates any z ∈ X \ {x, y}.
Now apply Lemma A.1.
Sometimes the set of alternatives that are indifferent on the top will contain more
than two alternatives. In this case the following lemma turns out to be helpful in many
cases.
Lemma A.3 Suppose that P is a rich domain. If there exist two distinct preferences
,′∈ P and an alternative y ∈ X satisfying
• rk [y,] ≥ 2
• ∀x ∈ X : x  y ⇒ x ′ y,
• ∀x ∈ X : x  y ⇒ rk [y,]− rk [x,] 6= rk [y,′]− rk [x,′],
then there exists a tie-breaking rule such that Borda count is manipulable on P.
Proof of Lemma A.3 Let k = rk [y,]. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} we shall denote
by xi the alternative with rk [xi,] = i. Pick a preference ′′∈ P having y as the top
alternative. We define values di := rk [xi,′′] − rk [y,′′] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Clearly, we have rk [y,] − rk [xi,] = k − i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Now let
J := arg mini∈{1,...,k−1} dik−i and A := {xj ∈ X : j ∈ J}. Pick an arbitrary j ∈ J .
Then it can be verified that a profile consisting of dj preferences of type  and k − j
preferences of type ′′ makes alternatives {y}∪A indifferent on the top. In particular,
we will take a profile (i)ni=1 ∈ Pn consisting of ldj preferences of type  and l (k − j)
preferences of type ′′ for which
n∑
i=1
rk [y,i] =
n∑
i=1
rk [a,i] <
n∑
i=1
rk [b,i]− 2 (#X − 1)
is satisfied for all a ∈ A and all b ∈ X \ ({y} ∪A), where l is a suffciently large positive
integer. Thus, we can restrict our attention to alternatives in {y} ∪A.
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We have to deal with two cases. First, suppose that there exists an alternative
a ∈ A such that rk [y,]− rk [a,] < rk [y,′]− rk [a,′]. If we select a tie-breaking
rule, which prefers y to all alternatives in A, then a voter having preference  can
manipulate by revealing ′, since he prefers any alternative in A to y.
Second, suppose that for all alternatives a ∈ A we have rk [y,] − rk [a,] >
rk [y,′] − rk [a,′]. If we select a tie-breaking rule, which prefers all alternatives in
A to y, and consider a profile in which one voter’s preference of type  in (i)ni=1 is
replaced by ′, then this voter with preference ′ can manipulate by revealing , since
he prefers any alternative in A to y. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3 We prove the contraposition of the statement, i.e., if a rich
domain P ⊆ PX does not satisfy ERD, then there exists a tie-breaking rule for which
the Borda count is manipulable on P. Hence, suppose that the rich domain P ⊆ PX
does not satisfy ERD.
Step 1: We can assume without loss of generality that the rich domain P violating
ERD consists of exactly q preferences (recall that q = #X). This can be verified
as follows. Take an arbitrary rich domain P violating ERD with #P > q. Choose
q preferences from P with different top alternatives, and denote the corresponding
domain by P0. If P0 violates ERD, then we are done. On the other hand, if P0 does
not violate ERD, then P0 = Z () for any  ∈ P0 by Proposition 1. Consider any
preference ordering 0∈ P \ P0 and replace the preference in P0 with the same top
alternative as 0 by the ordering 0. As is easily verified, the resulting domain violates
ERD. Henceforth, we thus assume that P = {1, . . . ,q} is rich and violates ERD.
Step 2: We will construct a “chain” of alternatives and preferences. Start with
preference 1 and denote its top alternative by x1 and its second ranked alternative by
x2. Without loss of generality we can assume that 2 has x2 on top. To describe how
the procedure goes on suppose that we have already obtained a sequence of distinct al-
ternatives x1, . . . , xk such that rk [xi,i] = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and rk [xi,i−1] = 2
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Now we define xk+1 recursively to be the second ranked alterna-
tive of k. We have found a “chain” if xk+1 equals one of the alternatives x1, . . . , xk.
Otherwise, we can suppose without loss of generality that xk+1 is the top alternative
of k+1. We iterate the described procedure until we obtain a “chain” of alternatives.
Clearly, this procedure terminates in at most q steps. Thus, we can determine indices
m, p ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that m < p, xm, . . . , xp are all distinct, rk [xi,i] = 1 and
rk [xi+1,i] = 2 for all i ∈ {m, . . . , p − 1}, and rk [xp,p] = 1 and rk [xm,p] = 2.
In what follows we can assume without loss of generality that m = 1. Nevertheless we
will still denote the length of the chain by p. Furthermore, let X ′ := {x1, . . . , xp} and
P1 := {1, . . . ,p}.
Step 3: We can manipulate by Lemma A.2 for some tie-breaking rules if there
exists a preference i∈ P1 in which the top two alternatives violate ERD. Hence, in
the following analysis we can assume that the top two alternatives of all 1, . . . ,p
satisfy ERD. But this implies that the top p alternatives of the preferences in P1 follow
the pattern shown in Table 2. Clearly, if p = q, we cannot have a violation of ERD by
Proposition 1, hence we must have p < q.
Case (i): Suppose that there exists an alternative y ∈ X that is ranked by two
distinct preferences i and j (i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}) at the p+1th position. Then y violates
ERD with all alternatives x1, . . . , xp, since P is a rich domain and all alternatives
x1, . . . , xp are ranked differently according to i and j while y is ranked identically
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Table 2: A full cycle on the top
1 2 . . . p−1 p . . .
x1 x2 . . . xp−1 xp . . .
x2 x3 . . . xp x1 . . .
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
xp−1 xp . . . xp−3 xp−2 . . .
xp x1 . . . xp−2 xp−1 . . .
...
...
...
...
by these two preferences. Hence, taking i, j and y we can apply Lemma A.3.
Case (ii): Suppose that the alternatives y1, . . . , yp ∈ X are all distinct and are
ranked p+ 1th by the preferences 1, . . . ,p, respectively. Let Y := {y1, . . . , yp}.
We claim that if there exists an alternative yi ∈ Y and a preference j∈ P1 such
that rk [yi,j ] − rk [xi,j ] 6= p, then yi violates ERD with all alternatives in X ′,
and manipulation is possible by Lemma A.3, taking i, j and yi as , ′ and y,
respectively. We check this claim without loss of generality for alternative yp.
6 Of
course, rk [yp,p] − rk [xp,p] = p and therefore, rk [yp,j ] − rk [xp,j ] 6= p implies
that xp and yp violate ERD. Suppose that d := rk [yp,j ]− rk [xp,j ] < p. Note that
we have rk [xp,j ] = p− j + 1 and therefore, it follows that rk [yp,p]− rk [xi,p] =
p − i > rk [yp,j ] − rk [xi,j ] = d − i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}. In addition, for
all i ∈ {j, . . . , p − 1} we have rk [yp,p] − rk [xi,p] = rk [xp,j ] − rk [xi,j ] <
rk [yp,j ]−rk [xi,j ]. Now suppose that d = rk [yp,j ]−rk [xp,j ] > p. Then clearly,
rk [yp,j ]−rk [xi,j ] > d > p > rk [yp,p]−rk [xi,p] = p−i for all i ∈ {j, . . . , p−1}.
Furthermore, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} we have rk [yp,p] − rk [xi,p] = p − i <
rk [yp,j ] − rk [xi,j ] = d − i. Hence, in any case yp and xi violate ERD for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
We still have to investigate the case in which for all alternatives yi ∈ Y and for
all preferences j∈ P1 we have rk [yi,j ] − rk [xi,j ] = p. For this case the first p
preferences are illustrated in Table 3. If 2p < q, then we can mimic the arguments
given so far for alternatives ranked, by some preference relations in P1, at the 2p+ 1th
position. By doing so, in a similar way as in case (i), we can derive that manipulation is
possible through an appropriately selected tie-breaking rule if an alternative is ranked
twice at the 2p + 1th position by some preferences in P1. Otherwise, let zi be the
alternative for which rk [zi,i] = 2p+1 and let Z := {z1, . . . , zp}. Now, in an analogous
way as in the beginning part of case (ii) one can argue that we can manipulate if there
exists an alternative zi ∈ Z such that there exists a preference j∈ P1 such that
rk [zi,j ]− rk [yi,j ] 6= p. The case that remains to be investigated whenever 3p ≤ q
is illustrated in Table 4.
Alternatives y1, . . . , yp are all top alternatives of a certain preference relation since
P is a rich domain. We shall denote the set of these preferences by P2. Without
6If we relabel the alternatives and preferences cyclically, then the claim follows for all the other
alternatives y1, . . . , yp−1 in the same way.
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Table 3: Two consecutive full cycles
1 2 . . . p−1 p . . .
x1 x2 . . . xp−1 xp . . .
x2 x3 . . . xp x1 . . .
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
xp−1 xp . . . xp−3 xp−2 . . .
xp x1 . . . xp−2 xp−1 . . .
y1 y2 . . . yp−1 yp . . .
y2 y3 . . . yp y1 . . .
...
...
·
·
·
...
...
yp−1 yp . . . yp−3 yp−2 . . .
yp y1 . . . yp−2 yp−1 . . .
...
...
...
...
Table 4: Three consecutive full cycles
1 . . . p . . .
x1 . . . xp . . .
...
·
·
·
...
xp . . . xp−1 . . .
y1 . . . yp . . .
...
·
·
·
...
yp . . . yp−1 . . .
z1 . . . zp . . .
...
·
·
·
...
zp . . . zp−1 . . .
...
...
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Table 5: Two full cycles on the top
1 . . . p p+1 . . . 2p . . .
x1 . . . xp y1 . . . yp . . .
...
·
·
·
...
...
·
·
·
...
xp . . . xp−1 yp . . . yp−1 . . .
y1 . . . yp
...
...
...
·
·
·
...
yp . . . yp−1
z1 . . . zp
...
·
·
·
...
zp . . . zp−1
...
...
loss of generality we can assume that rk [yi,p+i] = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Thus,
P2 = {p+1, . . . ,2p} ⊂ P. In what follows we have to consider four subcases.
Subcase (a): There exists a preference p+i∈ P2 that ranks an alternative u ∈
X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ) second, i.e., rk [u,p+i] = 2. Then yi and u violate ERD and P is
manipulable with respect to an appropriate tie-breaking rule by Lemma A.2.
Subcase (b): The set of second ranked alternatives of all preferences in P2 is a
subset of Y . If there exists a preference in P2 with top two alternatives violating ERD,
then we can apply Lemma A.2. Otherwise, if the top two alternatives of all preferences
in P2 satisfy ERD, then P2 must have a very special structure, since yi is ranked just
above yi⊕1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p} whenever yi is ranked above yi⊕1.7 Thus, we must
have preferences as shown in Table 5. Let
A :=
{
x ∈ X ′ :
p∑
i=1
rk [x,p+i] ≤
p∑
i=1
rk [u,p+i] for all u ∈ X ′
}
.
Now pick an alternative xi ∈ A and we will make A ∪ Y indifferent on the top. Define
d :=
(∑p
j=1 rk [xi,p+j ]
)
− 12p(p + 1). For each ∈ P1 taking d voters and for each
′∈ P2 taking p2 voters we obtain a profile in which all x ∈ A and all y ∈ Y are
indifferent on the top. In particular, any x ∈ A beats all alternatives in X ′ \ A and
any y ∈ Y beats all alternatives in X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ), while alternatives x ∈ A and y ∈ Y
receive the same Borda score. Pick an alternative xi ∈ A and consider a voter having
preference i⊕1. Suppose that the tie-breaking rule prefers yi⊕1 to xi and xi to all
7For two integers k, l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, if k + l 6= p and k + l 6= 2p, we define k ⊕ l := (k + l) mod p,
while if k + l = p or k + l = 2p, we define k ⊕ l := p.
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Table 6: The final case of subcase (c)
1 2 3 4 5 6 . . .
x1 x2 x3 y1 y2 y3 . . .
x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3 . . .
x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x1 . . .
y1 y2 y3 x3 x1 x2 . . .
y2 y3 y1 · · · . . .
y3 y1 y2 y2 y3 y1 . . .
z1 z2 z3 y3 y1 y2 . . .
z2 z3 z1 · · ·
z3 z1 z2 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
other alternatives. Then a voter having preference i⊕1 could manipulate by revealing
i⊕2.
Subcase (c): The set of second ranked alternatives of all preferences in P2 is a
subset of X ′. If there exists a preference p+j∈ P2 that ranks an alternative xi with
i 6= j second, then the top two alternatives of p+j violate ERD8 and therefore, by
Lemma A.2 we can find a tie-breaking rule making manipulation possible. Hence, in
what follows we can assume that rk [xi,p+i] = 2 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Since we know
that the alternatives in X ′ satisfy ERD, P2 must have again a very special structure
because xi is ranked just above xi⊕1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p} whenever xi is ranked above
xi⊕1. Thus, any ∈ P2 must rank the alternatives of X ′ from the 2nd to the p + 1th
position in a cyclic pattern. Therefore, in any preference p+i∈ P2 we have xj p+i yj
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p} \ {i}. Hence, if there exists a preference p+i∈ P2 and a pair of
alternatives xj , yj (j ∈ {1, . . . , p} \ {i}) such that rk [yj ,p+i]− rk [xj ,p+i] 6= p, then
the top two alternatives yj and xj of p+j violate ERD and we are done by applying
Lemma A.2.
We still have to investigate the case in which for all preferences p+i∈ P2 and for all
pairs of alternatives xj , yj (j ∈ {1, . . . , p}\{i}) we have rk [yj ,p+i]−rk [xj ,p+i] = p.
For the case of p = 3 we illustrate this case in Table 6. Clearly, this case can only occur
whenever 2p < q. Observe that the p+2nd positions of each preference in P2 have to be
filled with an alternative from X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ). Suppose that we have rk [u,p+1] = p+2
for an alternative u ∈ X \ (X ′ ∪ Y ). Then u violates ERD with all alternatives ranked
by p+1 above u (i.e., with all alternatives in X ′ ∪ {y1}), since P is a rich domain.
More specifically, if u 6= z2, then we can apply Lemma A.3 with p+1,1 and u; while
if u = z2, then we can apply Lemma A.3 with p+1,2 and u.
Subcase (d): We still have to investigate the case in which the second ranked alter-
natives in P2 come from both X ′ and Y . First, observe that as in subcase (c), if there
exists a preference p+j∈ P2 that ranks an alternative xi with i 6= j 2nd, then xi and
8In fact, looking at Table 3 it is easy to verify that all pairs xi and yj (i 6= j) violate ERD, while all
pairs xi ∈ X′ and yi ∈ Y satisfy ERD on P1. For instance, if i < j, then the sequence (rk [xi,k])pk=1
decreases until k = i and jumps up by p− 1 afterwards, whereas (rk [yi,k])pk=1 still decreases after
k = i. Hence, the rank differences between xi and yj differ according to preferences i and i+1.
One can argue analogously in case of 1 ≤ j < i ≤ p.
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Table 7: The final case of subcase (d)
1 2 3 4 5 6 . . .
x1 x2 x3 y1 y2 y3 . . .
x2 x3 x1 y2 x2 · . . .
x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 · . . .
y1 y2 y3 x3 x1 · . . .
y2 y3 y1 x1 · · . . .
y3 y1 y2 · · · . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
yj violate ERD and we can apply Lemma A.2. Hence, in what follows we can assume
that if rk [u,p+i] = 2 and u ∈ X ′, then u = xi.
Second, if there exists a preferencep+i∈ P2 that ranks an alternative y ∈ Y \{yi⊕1}
second, then yi and y violate ERD and we are done by Lemma A.2.
Finally, we can assume that there exists p+i∈ P2 such that rk [yi⊕1,p+i] = 2
and rk
[
xi⊕1,p+(i⊕1)
]
= 2. Now if rk [xi⊕1,p+i] > 3, then the top two alternatives
yi⊕1 and xi⊕1 of p+(i⊕1) violate ERD and we are finished by Lemma A.2. Otherwise,
if rk [xi⊕1,p+i] = 3, then we can make xi⊕1 and yi indifferent on the top by taking
for all preferences ∈ P1 two voters each and p2 voters with p+i.9 In particular, yi
beats any other alternative in X \X ′ and xi⊕1 beats any other alternative in X ′, while
yi and xi⊕1 receive the same Borda score. Since xi⊕1 and yi violate ERD, we can apply
Lemma A.1.
9For p = 3 and i = 1 this case is illustrated in Table 7.
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